Integrity and Agreement: Economics When Principles Also Matter by Minkler, Lanse
University of Connecticut
OpenCommons@UConn
Economics Working Papers Department of Economics
July 2007




Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/econ_wpapers
Recommended Citation
Minkler, Lanse, "Integrity and Agreement: Economics When Principles Also Matter" (2007). Economics Working Papers. 200727.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/econ_wpapers/200727
Department of Economics Working Paper Series











This working paper is indexed on RePEc, http://repec.org/
Table of Contents
Chapter 1:  Why Integrity?   9
Chapter 2:  Preference-Integrity  26
2.1  Utility Theory  26
2.2  Preference-Integrity  31
2.3  An Assessment of Preference-Integrity  34
Chapter 3:  Commitment-Integrity  42
3.1  Commitment-Integrity  42
3.2  Reasons  52
3.3  An Assessment of Commitment-Integrity  58
3.4  Failures to Act with Commitment-Integrity  62
3.5  Psychological Foundations  68
3.6  Conclusion  80
Chapter 4:  Social Dilemmas and Game Theory  93
4.1  The Prisoner’s Dilemma  95
4.2  Preference-Integrity and Lying in Game Theory 101
4.3  Evolutionary Game Theory 113
4.4  Integrity in Evolutionary Game Theory 117
Chapter 5:  Lying, Contracts, and Political Behavior 125
5.1  Lying and Mutual Deceit 125
5.2  Legal Contracts 131
5.3  Political Agreements 134
Chapter 6:  The Employment Agreement 145
6.1  The Theory of the Firm and the Importance of Shirking 146
6.2  Worker Integrity 151
6.3  Mutual Deceit in the Employment Agreement 156
6.4  Managing Workers of Integrity 160
6.5  Integrity and Other Views of the Firm 164
6.6  Conclusion 169
Chapter 7:  Religious Agreements: Beyond the Minimalist Principle 177
7.1  The Economic Theory of Religion 179
7.2  Religious Integrity 181
7.3  Multidimensional Identity and Incoherence 186 
Chapter 8:  The Social Contract and Human Rights 193
8.1  Human Rights 194
8.2  Coherence, Dignity, and Human Rights 197
Chapter 9:  On the Possibility of Integrity 211
9.1  Moral Training and Moral Leadership 212
9.2  Institutions 220
9.3  Conclusion 228
Chapter 10:  Conclusion 234
Bibliography 246
Chapter One:  Why Integrity?
Consider the proposition “lying is wrong.”  True or false?  My experience has
shown that most people quickly answer “true.”  Not surprisingly, the question tends to be
a little more problematic for economists.
The first time I asked someone whether lying is wrong, it was of a job candidate.
When she dutifully asked what I was working on I innocently asked the question above to
help explain.  The look on her face was a mixture of confusion and terror.  I wasn’t trying
to trick her, but I could sense her apprehension in weighing her options.  If she answered
“true,” she might have thought I would not think her a good economist, while if she
answered “false,” I might spring some fancy ethical trap.  Had she answered “false” it
likely would have been because she realized that economists don’t deal much with ethics.
We deal with preferences and rationality, and thus verbal claims against preferences are
just non-credible “cheap talk.”  Her hesitancy signaled she was not a certain type of
naturalist, for whom ethical questions like the one posed are nonsense, in which case she
could have immediately blurted out “false.”  On the other hand, she may have had some
faint recollection about the notions of right and wrong from before her graduate training
and thought that somehow she should answer “true.”1  Her dilemma was apparent.  She
decided against either response, and after some awkward mumbling we talked instead
about New England weather.
Since the question refers to a moral principle, it asks about one’s understanding of
the world.  Were one to thoroughly embrace the principle, so much so that it formed part
of one’s identity, we might be able to say that the person was a person of integrity.  In
that case, to violate a moral principle the person takes to be true (by lying) would be to
act contrary to her own understanding of the world and thus her understanding of her own
self as well, which would be incoherent.  Even in a weaker case, one more consistent
with current economic theory, if the person did not identity with the moral principle but
instead had a strong preference over it, she would still have reason not to lie.
In this book I will develop the notion of two different kinds of integrity.  One
focuses on identity-conferring commitments to principles, the other on preferences for
principles.  But while they differ in their particulars, most fundamentally, both refer to
honest behavior.  The possibility of integrity and honest behavior is important any time
there are economic agreements.2  That covers a lot of economics.  This book will cover
informal interactions that characterize social dilemmas, formal legal agreements between
buyers and sellers, political agreements, employment agreements, religious agreements,
and the social contract.  In each of these cases, the possibility of integrity changes the
answers given by neoclassical economics and instrumental rationality (rational decision-
making in one’s own self-interest) because to make an agreement that one has no
intention of honoring is to lie.  This simple but powerful fact seems to have eluded most
economic analyses.
The analysis here will not require heroic assumptions.  We will not focus on the
few individuals who might embrace a myriad of moral principles and possess the kind of
strength of will that, like Don Quixote, leads them to try to right every wrong.  But
neither will we confine ourselves to the kind of lead character presented in Ben Johnson’s
play, Volpone.  While nothing prevents a rational economic man from also being moral,
when it comes to economic agreements, he is most often characterized as opportunistic.3
More beautifully articulated, Volpone is ruthlessly selfish and engages in:
… sanctimonious speeches, lust and possessiveness poorly disguised as love and
marriage, cynical legalism passing itself off as pure justice, boastful name-dropping that
pretends cultural sophistication, snobbery congratulating itself that is decorum, and greed
deluding itself that it is really prudence, responsibility, even religion.4
Even though Volpone provides a colorful foil for the ruthlessly moral Don Quixote, we
will instead focus most of our attention on a normal person in normal economic
circumstances. Like most of us, she takes at least some principles seriously, but she also
has to grapple with other considerations, most notably her own preferences and tempting
rationalizations.  But we do know that average people in real life do keep their
agreements even when they could cheat.  Plumbers sometimes do as they say, workers do
provide good efforts, business partners don’t cheat each other, contractors keep their
agreements, people follow their religious vows, and even politicians sometimes do what
they promise.  These kinds of honored agreements are what make the economy and
society work.
It will be necessary to aim a fair amount of attention at the existence of principles.
Sometimes principles are taken to be truths or laws or as starting points for reasoning.  As
I have already suggested, I characterize principles as general propositions that can be
taken as either true or false.  Once a principle is accepted as true, it provides a sort of
universality that applies to beliefs and actions.  If I accept “lying is wrong” as true, I am
not free to interpret it as meaning I have to tell the truth to only right handed people, but
not necessarily to left handed people.  There may be exceptional cases like lying to
prevent great harm, but most candidates for such exceptions fail a meaningful relevance
test.  Moreover, this universal character also applies no matter what my preferences are.  I
may not want to tell the truth to some left-handed person, but that doesn’t mean that
“lying is wrong” suddenly becomes false.  The principle holds in spite of my own
preferences.   Thus principles and preferences are different, and so both will be included
in the analyses in this book.
While preference and principles are independent from one another, individuals
still possess preferences over principles.  I possess a preference over “lying is wrong” to
the extent that if I act on that principle I may receive positive utility.  The more important
point now is that it is the existence of principles that will form the basis for one kind of
integrity, commitment-integrity, and the preferences for principles that forms another
kind, preference-integrity.  The former requires individuals to make judgments about the
truth or falsity of principles, while the latter only requires a complete preference
mapping.
If individuals recognize the existence of principles and include them in their
decision-making process, the next question becomes which one or ones should we focus
on.  While some of the analysis will consider additional principles, the principle I have
already referred to, “lying is wrong,” turns out to be both fundamental and also the
principle most relevant for economic agreements.  Virtually all religious and
philosophical traditions counsel against lying, even if they differ in their justifications
and exceptions.5  It holds the same elevated status as “murdering innocents is wrong” in
most traditions, in the sense of its barely qualified condemnation.  The principle is also
most relevant for economic agreements because all agreements are representations, and
lying is an intentional misrepresentation.  Therefore, most of the analysis centers on what
I call the minimalist principle, “lying is wrong.”  And by basing it on just one
fundamental principle, the analysis stays more tractable.
To what extent do people base their acts on principled decision-making?  As an
empirical matter we do know that the behavioral postulate of instrumental rationality is
violated with great regularity.  Most commentators on the subject have pointed to
commonplace behaviors not involving agreements, like tipping, tax paying, voting,
contributing to public goods, and helping others when there is no chance of reciprocity.
Sometimes people are even heroic.6  Overwhelming experimental evidence also shows
that people often cooperate against their material interests.  Experimenters use social
dilemmas like a prisoner’s dilemma or voluntary contribution to a public good where,
based on instrumental rationality, the dominant strategy is to defect.  But consistently
great numbers do not defect, even where there is anonymity and the game is played only
once.7  In his meta-analysis of 37 different studies consisting of 130 distinct social
dilemma experiments, David Sally calculates a mean cooperation rate of 47.4% for the
entire pooled sample.8  By awarding the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics to psychologist
Daniel Kahneman, the “behavioralist school” with its critique of instrumental rationality
has been decisively legitimized.9  That does not mean, however, that instrumental
rationality is still not a useful theoretical construct or a good first empirical
approximation.  The findings of the behavioralist school (and perhaps others) may yet be
incorporated.  One of the virtues of neoclassical economics is that it can fold new ideas
and findings into its considerable maw, sometimes almost seamlessly (witness models of
imperfect information).
It also seems beyond question that many normal people in normal circumstances
have an aversion against lying for material gain.  Again, the limited existing evidence is
supportive.  One empirical regularity in experimental settings is that communication
significantly increases cooperation.10  More to the point, David Sally estimates in his
meta-analysis that (non-credible) promises to cooperate elicited by experimenters
increase cooperation by 12-30%, depending on the regression model.11  That finding in
particular suggests that even people in contrived situations recognize and act on the
minimalist principle.  More recently, Uri Gneezy experimentally tests the propensity to
lie by varying the harm that lying causes.  His main finding is that “the average person
prefers not to lie, when doing so only increases her payoff a little but reduces the other’s
payoff a great deal.”12  Social psychologists similarly find that most lies are “white lies”
aimed at affecting the perceptions of others, rather than lies with the purpose of material
gain.13
Finally, for admittedly unconventional evidence, consider the offerings of
classical literature.  I have already mentioned Don Quixote, that beloved but doomed
character created by Cervantes who unrelentingly champions good.  Don Quixote
embraces all moral principles, delusively perhaps, and repeatedly puts his and his squire’s
life on the line to defend them.  Or consider Joseph Conrad’s Lord Jim.  Jim is the
confident, flawlessly principled sea ship officer.  Yet in one inexplicable moment, he
abandons his ship loaded with passengers when he believes it to be hopelessly doomed.
Jim then spends the rest of his life trying to recover the sense of himself that he himself
deserted.  In one case we affectionately root for the character who fights for the
impossible, in the other we sympathetically mourn for the one who abandons that which
seems so possible.  The kinds of affection and sympathy that these characters have
evoked in generations of readers is deeply felt because integrity matters.  Don Quixote
represents the flawed man who reaches for perfection -- unattainable integrity; and Jim,
the ideal man who falls from grace -- lost integrity. We are moved by their stories time
and again because we think integrity is real and important.
Still, I cannot claim that the evidence suggests that principled behavior or
integrity is ubiquitous.  People are certainly interested in integrity--- in 2005 it was the
most looked up word on Merriam-Webster’s website.14  And it may turn out that integrity
is more pervasive than we know, we just haven’t really looked carefully enough.  To the
extent that it is desirable, we might look into ways of increasing its frequency (the topic
of chapter 9).  Of course, adding integrity to the motivational mix might only add to the
cost of complexity with little or insufficient benefit.  That could be the methodological
position of those embracing Milton Friedman’s positivism, or some version of it.15  On
that view, a good theory is one that predicts well, quite apart from the realism of the
theory’s assumptions.  When combined with Okhams Razor, the best theory becomes the
one with the simplest assumptions that also predicts the best.  I would call this view
methodological simplicity, and, especially when considering the already staggering
complexity of some economic models, simplicity is a virtue.
But I think methodological realism is better.  In the version that I favor, we
should aim for a theory whose assumptions and predictions are both true.  That is, both
the theory’s assumptions and predictions should aim to correspond to the way things
really are, or possibly could be.  On this view, the real world exists independently of what
we think about it.  Our histories, values, and biases may affect the selection of our
theoretical analyses, but the intention is to bring our thinking into correspondence with
the objective, existing state of affairs, at least to the extent that we can.16  Of course the
goal of some theorizing may be to simply develop models that are logically and internally
consistent without reference to the world.  The goal of those kinds of analysis too is a
kind of logical truth.  But if the pursuit of truth contains some reference to the real world,
it seems incongruent to insist on truth in one aspect of a theory (e.g., implications), but
not another (e.g., assumptions).  If we are committed to seeking the truth about the world,
we should not partition it selectively.
The concern about the added complexity of real assumptions is legitimate,
however.  The assumptions that we do make should be true, but that does not answer the
question about how many true assumptions we should include in our analyses.  The issue
becomes one of balancing the costs and benefits, and reasonable people may disagree.  In
this book, beyond instrumental rationality—an assumption I think is true for many people
at many different times, I will only add one further assumption in the case of preference-
integrity, namely that a preference for honesty exists, and one set of assumptions in the
case of commitment-integrity, namely those relating to moral principles.  This added
realism generates novel implications.
As a preview, here are a few of the more interesting implications generated by
incorporating one version or another of integrity into analyses of economic agreements.
By including the possibility of preference-integrity in prisoners-dilemma type
interactions, modeled as a continuum of types, we will see that three distinct types of
players emerge.  Perhaps most importantly, a sufficient amount of integrity results in
higher payoffs by promoting a critical amount of cooperation.  Trust results from
honesty, not vice versa.  With respect to legal contracts, integrity can be consistent with
contractual breach, but not fraud.  In the political arena, either kind of integrity reduces
political shirking (voting against constituents’ interests) and can help explain why
legislators don’t change their votes in their last term of office.  In the employment
context, adding commitment-integrity leads to an implication that contrasts starkly with
the literature on the theory of the firm.  Whereas the received literature focuses on
employee (or contractor) shirking and then recommends monitoring, incentive contracts,
and hierarchy, the analysis presented here implies that creating clear, fair agreements will
take care of misaligned expectations, which leaves the door open for focusing on the
coordination of different input contributions, especially knowledge ones—the real
essence of the firm.  We will also see that adding integrity can help to solve some of the
anomalies in the economics of religion literature.  For instance, a person of religious
integrity has reason to engage in counter-preferential behaviors like refraining from
eating forbidden foods, even in private.  As a last example, we will see that, based on the
minimalist principle, a person of commitment-integrity also has reason to support a more
general social contract like human rights, under some fairly routine conditions.
Two concepts in particular drive the analysis: mutual deceit and coherence.
Mutual deceit pertains to the minimalist principle “lying is wrong.”  Not surprisingly,
there are some contexts in which it is morally acceptable to lie, like buying and selling at
a bazaar.  Economic agents themselves will treat some, but not all, situations as ones of
mutual deceit.  When contractual partners do not consent to lies, however, integrity does
indeed matter.  So a lot of emphasis will be placed on the context of economic
agreements.  Coherence, on the other hand, is a normative requirement of commitment-
integrity.  To illustrate, if one commits to the minimalist principle but then lies wildly,
that is a form of incoherence.  Lying to a left-handed but not to a right-handed person is
also incoherent.  Normatively, in either case, such a person could not be said to be a
person of integrity.  As a positive matter, some people surely recognize this coherence
requirement and behave accordingly.  Others may fail to act coherently because of a
weak will, self-deception, errors in judgment, or moral exclusion--- all factors which will
further contribute to the analysis.
To my knowledge, no other book has used integrity as the basis to study
agreements.  Nevertheless, several pioneering studies have touched on the same, or
closely related, issues.  Perhaps most centrally has been Amartya Sen’s illuminating use
of commitments as something different from preferences.17  While philosophers have
recognized the distinction for centuries, it has been a significant departure for economists.
Other major works often focus on altruism or cooperation.  For instance, Robert
Frank, in his seminal book Passions Within Reason, asks how mutually beneficial
interactions could occur in a world populated by both selfish and cooperative people.  By
using evolutionary processes as a metaphor, people are predisposed to either cooperate or
act selfishly.  If cooperators can interact with each other they get a higher joint payoff
than when selfish people interact with each other.  But, as in a prisoner’s dilemma game,
the highest payoff goes to those selfish people who can interact with cooperators.  The
problem is, how can cooperators credibly commit to actually behaving cooperatively?
Frank’s answer is that cooperation is a moral trait subject to evolutionary forces (i.e., it
must confer an important advantage), and that emotions both sustain and signal the
presence of this moral trait.  If detecting this signal in others requires a resource cost,
Frank finds an evolutionarily stable equilibrium such that cooperators and selfish people
exist simultaneously.  Justifiably, Frank’s approach and model have been enormously
influential.
The real difference lies in our different approaches.  While Frank locates moral
behavior in the emotions, and also gives them a strategic role, my analysis locates moral
behavior in the existence of a preference for honesty in the case of preference-integrity,
and conscious and reflective deliberation in the case of commitment-integrity.  While
Frank’s analysis follows philosopher David Hume because moral behavior stems from
irrational moral sentiments, mine features the usual notion of rationality in the case of
preference-integrity, and, in the case of commitment-integrity, follows philosopher
Immanuel Kant because moral behavior stems more from a person’s ability to reason.
That is not to say our accounts are incompatible; it is to say they are conceptually quite
distinct (more on this in chapter 4).
Commitment-integrity, in particular, is also conceptually quite different from
those preference-based accounts that similarly emphasize cooperative, social, and/or
moral behavior.  For instance, in Not Just for the Money, Bruno Frey builds the case that
people sometimes engage in behaviors simply because they like to.  People might do a
good job at work because they like to; they may vote because they like civic
participation, they may give blood or help another because they want to indulge their
altruistic preferences.  Borrowing from the psychology literature, the key insight is that
sometimes people will indulge these kinds of preferences less often when there are
incentives to act on them.  Sometimes such extrinsic interventions can crowd-out intrinsic
motivations, particularly if the interventions are seen as controlling.  So, sometimes
people just enjoy doing a good job and incentives to work hard may actually reduce such
efforts.  I will consider the issue more fully in chapter 6, but doing a good job because
one wants to versus doing a good job because one promised to are two very different
things.  It turns out that the evidence suggests both are important.
Another strand of the literature features multiple preference/utility models.  For
instance, in Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality, Howard Margolis offers a model in
which individuals get two irreducible kinds of utility from two different kinds of
preferences: private and social.  Self-interested acts fulfill one kind of preference,
altruistic acts another kind.  Innovatively, Margolis formulates a rule, operationalized as a
weight, that gives the ratio of spending in each category of preference necessary to result
in an equilibrium.  That weight, in turn, is subject to Darwinian evolutionary forces.
Evolution selects for those who are not narrowly self-interested, but instead for those
individuals who also participate in groups.  Of course that is a very different kind of an
account than one that relies on conscious reflection and commitments to principles, but in
any case the multiple preference/utility literature will be briefly assessed in chapter 3.18
If my explanation for why people would tell the truth in economic interactions
differs from that of economists, so does it differ for why people would lie.  For instance,
in Private Truths, Public Lies Timur Kuran suggests that people sometimes engage in
preference falsification, a type of lie in which one misrepresents her true motivation or
disposition in order to manipulate the perceptions of others.  For instance, such a person
might disingenuously feign a private preference in public in order to enhance her
reputation.  In contrast, for those who might otherwise be tempted to act with
commitment-integrity, lying stems more from a failure to choose moral principles,
weakness of will, errors in judgment, self-deception, or moral exclusion.  Moreover, and
once again, we largely focus on different contexts.  Kuran looks at scenarios where social
pressure might induce one to conform against one’s true preferences (e.g., revealing
one’s true political views).  Since the topic of this book is economic agreements, the
social pressure of fidelity would most often reinforce the behavior one promised in the
first place.
The organization of the book is straightforward, beginning with the development
of the theory.  Chapter 2 introduces preference-integrity, sketches a simple framework,
and assesses its strengths and weaknesses.  Chapter 3 does the same for commitment-
integrity, but since the concept is more of a departure, the chapter also goes into some
depth to include its philosophical and psychological foundations.  This chapter provides
the core theoretical foundation for the book.  Chapter 4 considers game theory and social
dilemmas.  The mathematical analysis in these chapters is simple, to keep the analysis as
accessible as possible.
Each of the four chapters that follow, chapters 5 through 8, explores a different
kind of agreement.  Chapter 5 first goes into some detail about the notions of lying and
mutual deceit in order to provide a solid foundation for the minimalist principle.  The
chapter then considers two different kinds of agreements, legal and political.  Chapter 6
considers the very important employment agreement.  As I alluded to earlier, the
existence of workers of integrity is particularly consequential for both actual firms and
also the literatures on the theory of the firm.  Chapter 7 considers religious agreements
and behavior. Religious principles are included which necessitates investigating other
issues, such as multiple identities.  The chapter provides an example for what happens
when we move beyond the minimalist principle.  Chapter 8 investigates the normative
requirement for a person of integrity who embraces only the minimalist principle, vis-a’-
vis human rights, a particular kind of social agreement.  The role of coherence is
particularly important here, and it provides the basis for thinking that persons of integrity
have reason to support human rights.
Assuming that integrity is something people value, the question then becomes
how it could be fostered.  Chapter 9 addresses that psychological question with a four
part decision-making framework by specifically considering moral training and moral
leadership.  In concluding, chapter 10 provides a summary of the thesis, addresses some
remaining objections, and considers how integrity might rank with other dispositions
worth valuing.  While I will try to anticipate the skeptics’ criticisms throughout, in this
last chapter I will address the concerns of a perhaps more sympathetic audience---
feminists and others, who might claim that the analysis here does not leave enough room
for dispositions like emotions or caring.
The kind of integrity considered in this book is not particularly special.  That’s
one reason why it merits further study.  To achieve that goal, I will occasionally motivate
chapters by deploying our friends Don Quixote and Volpone to illustrate opposite ends of
the spectrum.  To stand in for an ordinary person in the swirl of the complex middle, I
will place Martha.  Martha finds herself as a party to different kinds of economic
agreements that require decisions.  Does she follow the dictates of integrity, or the tug
and pull of her countervailing preferences?
                                                 
1  She might also have objected to the categorical nature of the question.  Many I have asked
wanted to say “true,” but could think of exceptions like lying to prevent harm or “white lies.”  I
will discuss those qualifications in detail later, but when I modify the proposition to “lying is
wrong in normal circumstances,” it really doesn’t seem to change the number of “true” and
“false” answers.
2  Earlier works that touch on the importance of honesty in economic interactions include Sen
(1978), Adler (1992), and Bowles (1998).
3  One might protest that self-interest is fundamentally moral in and of itself.  Indeed, Holmes
(1990) persuasively argues that self-interest as developed by Adam Smith and his contemporaries
did provide a contrast to the prevailing doctrines of honor and original sin, and that universal self-
interest is egalitarian and democratic because it requires respect for everyone’s interests.
Nevertheless, moral philosophers usually maintain that when it comes to the moral behavior of an
individual, the moral rightness of any act is independent of what the person might prefer.
4  Watson, ed, (2003, p. ix).
5  See Bok (1978), who I will often refer to, and will discuss in some detail in chapter 5.
6  Evidence and analysis of rescuing and heroic behavior is discussed in Mansbridge (1998).
7  See, for instance, Marwell and Ames (1981), Schneider and Pommerehne (1981), Caporael,
Dawes, Orbell, and van de Kragt (1989), Davis and Holt (1993), Frey and Bohnet (1995), and
Ledyard (1995).
8  Sally (1995, p. 62).  Also see Ledyard’s (1995) review for similar findings.  Caporel, Dawes,
Orbel and van de Kragt (1989) provide particularly good evidence against self-interested behavior
as normally conceived.
9 See Kahneman (2003) for a brief review of the evidence against “selfishness,” rationality, and
unchanging tastes.
10  John Ledyard in his 1995 chapter on public goods in the Handbook of Experimental
Economics concludes that the evidence on pre-play communication counts as a “strong effect”
that increases cooperation.  For instance, Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) report that
payoffs increased from 31% to 71% when relevant communication was allowed in one-shot
games.  Isaac and Walker (1988) find contribution rates of over 80% in one-shot public goods
type games with communication, and over 90% in repeated games.
11  Sally (1995, p. 78).
12  Gneezy (2005, p. 385).
13  DePaulo et al (1996) examined the daily diaries of 77 college students and 70 communities to
come to this conclusion.  While they do find evidence that some lies are told for personal
advantage, they “think that lies are less often told in the pursuit of goals such as financial gain
and material advantage and instead are much more often told in the pursuit of psychic rewards
such as esteem, affection, and respect.” (p. 981).  Such lies are also told to minimize the tension
with, and hurt feelings of, others.  Thus, these kinds of lies are not seen as serious by the liars.
1414 Associated Press report, Hartford Courant, December 11, 2005.
15  Friedman (1953).
16  One can find many different brands of realism in the literature on methodology (see, for
instance, Maki 1988 and Lawson 1997).  There are a lot of interesting epistemological and
ontologically issues.  My view is that there is an objectively existing real world, we can possibly
know that world, that the aim of economic theory is to accurately represent that world, and a
theory is better than another if it more accurately represents the world.  Because such
representations are subject to human comprehension, to say that one theory more accurately
represents the world leaves open the possibility of interpretation and thus persuasion.  Moreover,
our thinking can also change the world because thinking precedes acts and acts change the world.
                                                                                                                                                  
One kind of thinking has changed the world by introducing genocidal acts; another has changed it
by reducing or eliminating disease.  But to the extent that we truly understand the world, we may
be able to intentionally affect it with corresponding policies.
17  Sen 1978.
18 Along somewhat different lines from Margolis, but in line with the arguments in this book,
Amitai Etzioni, in The Moral Dimension, offered an influential framework in which individuals
are motivated by both moral principles and self-interested preferences.  Etzioni takes a
“moderately deontological” position with respect to moral acts: their rightness stems mostly from
an individual’s intent, not the estimated outcome.  Ultimately, however, Etzioni conceptualizes
such moral motivations in terms of moral preferences.
